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For TLS authentication with X.509 certificates, an identity from the DNS namespace MUST be checked against each subject Alt Name extension of type d NSName present in the certificate.
This section defines the identity comparison algorithm for a single APD entry.
[SIP] does not provide any guidelines on the presence of wildcards in certificates.
[PKIX], while not disallowing this explicitly, leaves the interpretation of wildcards to the individual specification.
Status of This Memo This is an Internet Standards Track document.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).
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###### Authors' Addresses Peter Saint-Andre Cisco 1899 Wyknoop Street, Suite 600 Denver, CO 80202 USA Phone: 1-303-308-3282 EMail: [email protected] Hodges Pay Pal 2211 North First Street San Jose, California 95131 US EMail: Jeff.
the Responding node) or psk_identity (for the client identity, i.e. When matching DNS names against d NSName or Common Name fields, matching is case- insensitive. If no such extension is present, then the identity MUST be compared to the (most specific) Common Name in the Subject field of the certificate. Implementations MUST NOT match any form of wildcard, such as a leading "." or "*." with any other DNS label or sequence of labels. For example, "foo.example.com" does not match "example.com".
Abstract Many application technologies enable secure communication between two entities by means of Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX) certificates in the context of Transport Layer Security (TLS).